Change your Insurer and go through a Broker , e.g Aon.

Dry powder extinguisher contents compact due to vibration in the vehicle. Unless they are taken out and vigorously agitated for a few minutes regularly, at least fortnightly, they will not discharge significant amounts of extinguishant when operated. You would have more success using the extinguisher to beat out a fire, or perhaps use it as a blunt tool to access a vehicle to extract a person.
Many years ago, as a Site Safe regional trainer I was given two 1 KG DP extinguishers as promotional and "image" material. On advice from the local Chief Fire Officer I tried the one that was in my vehicle. It expelled almost no powder. I then agitated for about 10 minutes the one that had been in my garage for several months. It gave a similar result with perhaps half a cup of powder expelled.
Enough said!!

In my opinion conformance with the ISO Standards has become too administratively burdensome for businesses with less than 200+ employees and does little to foment good work practices and safe physical work environments. Andrew summed it up pretty well, as has Cathy. As with ACC's WSMP programme, there's very little analysis and insight gained into work practices from those Systems audits. It's more about the scope of the "system", and the practices can be somewhat different i.e."work done vs work imagined". Much better to get an external reviewer / auditor with good industry experience to conduct a "fresh eyes" review of physical conditions and the working environment, observe work being performed, engage in conversation with workers about what, how, and why they do things, and produce a report that explains what appears to be good, what appears to be not so good, and what to do about the "not so good" stuff.

There is a lot of information on WorkSafe's website that is quite useful, and much that is less so. A lot of historical information that is still relevant and potentially useful has been archived, which is unfortunate. Pick the resource that suits your purpose and your business. It is the H&S outcome that needs to be achieved, and the options available to achieve it are discretionary in most cases. "Reasonably Practicable" is the guiding principle. It's great if Inspectors are able and willing to give advice, but they are not able to mandate that any business uses any particular WorkSafe information resource.

As others have pointed out, standards provide guidance but are not mandatory. However if a standard exists it may well be the premise upon which "reasonably practicable" is assessed. But we are supposedly taking a risk-based approach to managing hazards, which means there is scope to justify (or not) taking a theoretically available control measure such as wearing a hard hat. As Robb has correctly stated there are a number of factors that can shorten or extend the theoretical life of a hard hat. Writing on them with permanent markers, spray-painting them to change the colours, and attaching (as already mentioned) sticky labels with solvent-based adhesive will hasten the deterioration, along with prolonged UV exposure. E.g. the practice of putting a hard hat in the back window of the vehicle is a poor one.
Evolved practice is that a hardhat has a life of two years in an outdoor environment and three years indoor. A useful test is to grip the brims at either side and try and bend the brims inwards towards each other as far as possible. Any significant weakness in the hat will reveal itself by creaking noises and possibly stress cracks appearing. Apply the same test to the peak and the back brim.
I have several hardhats up to 10 years old in my garage. The one in my gear bag is six years old. I apply the bend/pressure test every time I take it out. It is flexible and sound as a bell. I have broken the brim off a hardhat after five years extensive use on construction sites. I took a hardhat from a construction worker who had spray-painted his white hat a bright fluorescent pink and split it down the middle applying the pressure test. It was barely 6 months old. He was gobsmacked, I smiled.
Apply the pressure test, and if in doubt, chuck it out!

I do note lots of road workers wearing hard hats when there is no obvious overhead hazard. In terms of managing hazards, I think they would be much better equipped with cotton some hats with wide brims and neck coverings. A sunhat would be more useful, much cheaper, and last longer than a hardhat that will have to be ditched after a couple of years. A risk assessment completed? I don't think so. More likely there is a "rule" written by someone in an office.

It may depend on what your primary interests are with respect to informative reading material. Most of the publication referred to in the previous posts relate to legislative interpretation, and influencing human behaviour. There are many publications that refer to the technical aspects of workplace health and safety in relation to identifying, assessing, monitoring and managing hazards. I have several in my library, some dating back to the 1980s, that continue to provide, to this day, useful information on identifying and analysing hazards ranging from how to conduct an occupational hygiene walk-through survey, how to interpret WES's, basic toxicology and epidemiology, the nature of gases and vapours, microbiological hazards, physical agents the workplace (RF radiation & ELF fields, vibration, heat stress, work in cold environments), noise and so on. Occupational Health and Hygiene – Guidebook for the WHSO by David Grantham, and Managing Occupational Health and Safety in Australia by Michael Quinlan and Philip Bohle, are two such examples, both published in 1992. A visit to the public library, or if in a small town, on your next visit to a larger city it would be worthwhile spending some time in the technical section. Identify from there, publications of interest, and follow-up on how to get hold of them.

We already have the sentencing bands established by the High Court in the Stumpmaster case, and the guidelines for judges to follow in assessing aggravating and mitigating factors when assessing culpability. There are enough cases already to provide guidance in setting the size of penalties having regard to the financial impecuniosity of the defendant, or simple ability to pay. There is scope for the court to impose other measures (orders) on an impecunious business as a way of making amends for their failures. The reasons for retaining the current status quo outlined by @SafetylawyerNZ are fully valid.

WorkSafe has the option of assessing culpability for health and safety failings on a case-by-case basis, and in doing so can elect not to prosecute in favour of other more productive outcomes following an investigation. This was in fact operational practice for OSH in the 1980's and 90's. Prosecution was reserved for repeat offenders, and those committing clearly flagrant and inexcusable breaches of the law.

The introduction of reparations as part of the penalty regime to compensate seriously injured victims replaced the lump sum compensation formally paid by ACC. This shifted the rationale for prosecutions but the impact was largely covered insurance available to meet the costs of legal representation, technical support, and the payment of reparations. The amount of the uninsurable financial penalty continues to be set by the court having regard to the defendant's ability to pay. The Stumpmaster case established the new penalty setting considerations in four parts, including -

(d) make an overall assessment of the proportionality and appropriateness of the combined packet of sanctions imposed by the preceding three steps. This includes consideration of ability to pay, and also whether an increase is needed to reflect the financial capacity of the defendant.

In Stumpmaster the defendants limited financial means lead to the court imposing a fine intended to serve as a deterrent to other self-employed persons. The defendant's professed ability to pay was 20% of the discounted fine settled on by the lower court having regard to all the influencing circumstances. However the court directed that the fine imposed be paid in instalments over 4 & 1/2 years. The High Court endorsed this approach.

I see no need for change, in the current prosecution and sentencing process other than in WorkSafe itself.
The review of WorkSafe's prosecution model has identified the need for change. I don't think their current ideas are anywhere near the mark. Since the mid-1990s WorkSafe has followed the Police prosecution model, and in fact had many of their inspectors trained by police investigators. This is a seriously flawed model for use in the health and safety context, and unfortunately the Review was conducted by an ex-senior policeman, which did nothing to advocate a change in methodology, but focused on tightening the existing processes.

The police investigation model seeks to establish whether an offence (crime) has been committed, and if evidence available suggests that is likely, they then set about identifying a perpetrator linked by the evidence to the offence. The focus becomes successfully prosecuting a perpetrator(s). They are pretty good at that, but we know what can happen when they have a perpetrator in their sights but gaps in their evidence.

In a health and safety investigation, identifying as many as possible of the contributing factors to an event is the primary objective. Once identified, those that are potentially controllable are assessed as to the practicability of possible controls. The consideration then is (a) whether those controls were available at the time, (b) should a PCBU have known about those possible controls, (c) were there valid reasons or mitigating circumstances for the available controls not being implemented, (d) if not what level of culpability should attach to the PCBU in those circumstances, (e) is enforcement action from the range of available options warranted, (f) if prosecution is appropriate is there sufficient and compelling evidence support a successful case, (g) what are the positive and negative outcomes in prosecuting the specific case, and are there a justifiable grounds for an alternative option?

Following that approach creates the opportunity to learn from events and develop workplace improvements that can be noted by WorkSafe and shared with industry. This approach is a quantum step away from the punitive approach embodied in the current WorkSafe investigation model, which focuses the courts on penalties and reparations.

This would lead to greater use of Enforceable Undertakings, Project Orders, and other available tools that produce more positive than negative outcomes. WorkSafe could thus take a more conciliatory approach to investigations and enforcement action, utilising their range of tools between Dutyholder Reviews and Enforceable Undertakings. WorkSafe could ascertain a PCBU's financial resources and proceed accordingly. This would leave a lot more money available for health and safety improvements. A focus on following the investigation model described above, and looking at the culpability of "officers" and directors of a PCBU in the most serious events would go a long way to keeping industry focused on the duties and obligations imposed by the law.

The Courts would then be hearing only the worst of the "cases", and this would both speed up the process, and reduce he costs, without further need to tinker with the law.

My wife (22 yrs in H&S) and I (38 yrs in H&S) saw the "meerkats" ad twice in one night. We both looked at each other and said, "What was that about?" Only the Worksafe name at the end of the ad got us thinking it must have been about H&S, but we didn't get the message. Then our discussion turned to the cost of running the ad. We agreed (she has insight into advertising costs on TV) that it would be a large 6 figure sum. If I didn't get the message there's precious little chance any of my clients would either. I think discussions will mainly centre on how obscure it is. That's a fail, I'm sorry, Worksafe.

Robyn.
Standards NZS 5235.1:1978 and 5235.2:1978 were the Codes of Practice for Safety in Mechanical Refrigeration (the Refrigeration Codes). 5235 Pt 1 refers to refrigeration systems with a total refrigeration effect or input energy in excess of 30 kW. 5235 Pt 2 refers to plant with input of less than 30 kW. 30 kW + is typically large freezer units found in freezing works, large cold storage facilities and food processing plants with large or multiple blast / storage freezers. Less than 30 kW plants are typically those walk-in freezers found in small commercial businesses such as butcher shops, food retailers, hotels, restaurants, and small transit depots for frozen goods.

I have a copy of the NZS 5235:1 -1978 version but not 5235:2. These two standards were updated in 1988, and then superseded by AS/NZS 1677 Pts1 & 2 in 1998.
As technology has changed so has the content of the standards. There is a greater focus on the range of hazards presented by the type of refrigerant used in the later standards. I suspect this has been refined yet again following the Tamahere cool store fire in the Waikato. You can purchase the standards for around $60 each.

In regard to your question about access/egress the principles are largely unchanged from the original Codes. There are requirements for both the plant room which houses the refrigeration equipment (refrigerant storage, compressor system) and the cold room (freezer) where product is stored. A cold room/freezer is defined as one where the operating temperature is at 5°C or below. The number of egress doors is determined by the size of the freezer space. There are requirements for illuminated exits, minimum door size, doors able to be opened outwards without use of a key, emergency signalling devices etc etc.

In the interests of providing general information but keeping my reply reasonably short, I can scan and email you a copy of the safety checklist for the codes if you wish. These are still relevant and completed checklists would be evidence that reasonably practicable steps have been taken to ensure safety in relation to refrigeration plant.

Simon, I agree with you that Hazard Registers are important and if properly done are central to a lot of health and safety activity. I also agree that they are generally poorly constructed, generic, symbolic, and generally exist because someone heard somewhere that a business had to have one.
Hazard Registers are not legally mandated, but it is a legislated requirement to identify and assess hazards. Proving that this has been done to a Worksafe Inspector or a judge is most easily achieved by having some form of record of those identified hazards, and a Hazard Register is probably what they would be looking for. There are other ways of recording hazards, such as JTA’s, WMS’s, SOP’s etc, and in fact they could all collectively constitute a hazard register, but a comprehensive record called a Hazard Register is probably the most practical.
Previously businesses were required to identify hazards, and then assess whether or not they were a Significant Hazard, i.e. an actual or potential source of Serious Harm (as defined). Under the HSAW Act wording of the requirement has changed slightly; hazards must still be identified but now “a PCBU, in managing risks to health and safety, must identify hazards that could give rise to reasonably foreseeable risks to health and safety”.

Based on the way that most HS practitioners and commentators, and consequently employers use the terms hazard and risk clear that they have not discerned the difference between “hazard” and “risk” and when this confusion/lack of understanding is manifested in Hazard registers the result is the epitome of our opening comments. (See the article “Lost in the Matrix ” in the July/August 2020 edition of Safeguard Magazine).

A hazard register should have at least 4 components, but to be really useful and effectual at least an additional 3.
1. A description of the identified source of harm/damage;
2. A Rating of the level of risk the raw hazard presents based on an assessment of Severity, Frequency of Exposure, and Probability of Occurrence. These components are best expressed numerically using large numerical groups, e.g. S – 50; F/E – 20; P – 20.
3. A description of the practicable controls to be applied to risk.
4. A Revised Rating of the level of risk anticipated when all the available practicable controls are in place.
There may be many elemental controls available, some able to be implemented collectively, and some implemented in the alternative. Where alternative controls might be possible/available alternative control should be rated separately and then the ratings compared]. Breaking down (analysing) the definition of Reasonably Practicable and applying it to the available control options the most practicable control can be identified by the attendant reduction in risk.

Additional components to a hazard register might include (5) a description of the location where the hazard exists, (6) roles/tasks/persons exposed, and(7) the frequency with which the effectiveness of the controls/reassessment of risk should be reviewed.

If hazard registers aren’t able to show a reduction in risk when controls are applied then the argument that “reasonably practicable steps” have been taken will be a difficult one to win. In such instances the register pretty much represents a simple form filling exercise.

I agree with the tenor of your statement Peter in that instructing people to 'be more careful ' , "use common sense", "follow the instructions" etc is hopelessly unreliable.
Engineering controls can be amongst the most effective means of reducing risk, but at the end of the day they are just a control measure and do not provide Elimination. Eliminate means the hazard no longer exists. Guarding a machine generally creates a physical barrier between the hazard as part and the persons exposed to it. The degree of sophistication and effectiveness of the control measure should be determined by the potential harm that could arise, the level of exposure that occurs, and the likelihood that a damaging event could still occur. Risk is a factor of all three elements (harm/severity, frequency of exposures, and likelihood/probability of a damaging occurrence). The practicability of the control (reasonably practical steps) is a factor of the risk, the availability, and the effectiveness of the control measure being considered.
Manufacturers have found ways to engineer controls into vehicles to reduce the propensity for drivers to lock their keys inside. They found various ways to balance human fallibility with cost-effective measures to maintain vehicle security and minimise damage. Quite possibly an engineering solution by vehicle manufacturers for preventing use of personal media devices in moving vehicles could be on the horizon.
We have accepted handheld RT communication devices in commercial vehicles for a long time. There is a balance that needs to be found between convenience and safety. In the meantime it looks like we are relying on self-discipline and third-party monitoring (police.)

A quick check of my personal library reveals 10 publications (Guidelines) produced by OSH - DoL in the 1990's relating to chemicals including 5 relating to solvents that are still accurate and relevant today. Topics include Management of Lead-based Paint, Safe Use of Glutaraldehyde in the Health Industry, Safe Use of Organic Solvents, Chronic Organic Solvent Neurotoxicity Diagnostic Criteria. There are others relating to substances hazardous to health. These are not discoverable on the Worksafe website.
It seems to me, Chris, that history is pretty much ignored, perhaps in favour of the "new wave". I've always been a believer in the notion that "if we're trying to move forward without any idea or recognition of where we've been, we're highly likely to just keep going round in circles" !
Thank you Peter!

Jared.
You have a fair grip on the subject, and Sheri has enhanced that.

Here is my analysis of the terms, having spent many many years conducting both activities.

Inspection: the physical examination of something, typically a piece of plant such as a machine, motor vehicle (WOF), or a workplace, usually to discover / disclose any defects present that might amount to non-compliance, a safety concern, a quality issue, omissions etc. An Inspection Report should report on findings and might recommend changes / improvements.

Audit: an evidence-based assessment of conformance with specific criteria or standard(s) e.g. Tax Audit, Quality Systems audit, H & S systems audit, typically to assess, identify, and report on conformance / nonconformance with the criteria. An Audit Report should detail whether the audited body is meeting the criteria it has committed to or is obliged to meet, and may include recommendations.

The analogy I have used many times when addressing this issue with prospective clients is that health and safety compliance is rather like tax compliance, because most businesses have an inkling that they will have to pay attention to taxation obligations.
1 Both business obligations (tax and H and S) are mandated through and underpinned by legislation;
2 Business owners can decide what proportion of their duties they wish to physically manage themselves and what will be contracted/delegated to an external advisor;
3 Some advisers are knowledgeable and experienced, and some not so.
4 There is a variety of software available to guide the process, some better than others, and its buyer beware;
5 There are substantial benefits and advantages to be gained from getting it right;
6 There are substantial penalties for getting it wrong;
7 Whichever support path the business chooses - going it alone or engaging an advisor - it is prudent to get a specialist to assess (audit) the business at least annually with a gap analysis to identify strengths and weaknesses and advise on where advantages can be gained, or penalties for non-compliance incurred.

Somewhat closer to home, reading the Stumpmaster case (Stumpmaster, Tasman Tanning, Niagara Sawmilling) which has established the penalty setting bands for HSAW Act sentencing) it was found that two of the Companies appealing their penalties knew of defects in their working arrangements / conditions yet failed to act appropriately to remedy the defects.

In one case there was a preceding similar accident; in the other the company had received competent advice on how to remedy a defect but chose not to, without providing any rationale for that decision, and an i9njury accident subsequently occurred.

The result in both cases meant the appeals were lost, the penalties re-affirmed (fortunately [?] not increased), with the circumstances influencing the High Court's determinations around mitigating vs aggravating factors.

When there is hard (documented) evidence of failures / defects / non-compliance, and practicable steps are available to mitigate the risk prior to any incident occurring, there is justifiably no real wriggle room left, and nor should there be.

An OSH Certificate is in fact a Certificate of Competency for a Class / Type of forklift issued by an OSH -approved trainer. OSH verified the training was in accordance with the Code of Practice for Training Operators and Instructors of Powered Industrial Lift Trucks. Osh visited and "approved" the trainer. I don't know that OSH, now Worksafe have continued that function. An F endorsement was issued by an "NZTA" licensed vehicle driving instructor. They were able to issue certificates of competence and endorsements for operators of the range of vehicle / mobile plant types they were approved to instruct on. One class is licensed and other classes are added as endorsements. I believe licenses are required for operating on public roads, but not essential for public "spaces" i.e private spaces the public has free access to.
However, I am sure that if an operator has an F endorsement on their driver's license, and that license is suspended or cancelled the suspension includes for all the endorsements. So if your forklift operator, truck driver or loader driver only has an endorsement(s) on their car license and that license is suspended due to accumulated demerit points or traffic infringements, for example, they lose the right to drive everything on the license!
Still need them to operate the mobile plant? Get them through an appropriate course with an approved instructor who offers a Certificate of Competence related to an appropriate Standard.

Exactly right John. Which is why modern motor vehicles have all the hi-tech systems designed to reduce the likelihood people will lock their keys in the car. It's still possible, but a pretty good balance between achieving vehicle security (locking the vehicle) and human fallibility ( forgetting the keys are in the car (ignition, handbag, centre console, boot etc) has been achieved. At some cost, of course, but avoiding the cost of call-outs or damaging the vehicle. An engineering solution to an acknowledgement of human fallibility (aka human error).

I read this report some days ago and just scratched my head in wonderment! I'm sure most people have heard the phrase "to err is human".

Errors of judgement etc made by people always will occur, and will / do contribute to accidents.

Typically, in cases like this, "human error" is offered as an excuse, being unforeseeable contributor to the event which should be taken into account when assessing culpability.

Whether or not human error is a valid "cause / contributor" to the event the key issue is "how can causal factors, including actions / inactions of people (errors) be controlled / minimised / prevented? 20 or 30 possible causal factors could probably be identified in the case in point. Identifying as many contributing factors as possible, then assessing which factors offer some possibility for control (change) is the purpose of an investigation.

A Risk Assessment should evaluate the likelihood that contributing factors may re-occur. Introducing rules, procedures, education, supervision, audits etc as possible controls may all help in some way. The Risk Assessment process should serve to evaluate the likely effectiveness of the proposed controls, i.e how much reduction in risk do they provide, and is that level of reduction reasonable in the circumstances?

So I think it doesn't really matter what labels are given to causal factors. The focus must be on predictability of occurrence, and practicability of control.

The term Human Error is considered distasteful because it smacks of victim blaming, and suggests uncontrollability. In the same vein the term "accident prone" is used. I suspect most practitioners would avoid using those terms. Yet rules and procedures are still religiously introduced in our workplaces in an effort to constrain and control human behaviour, much like the road speed limits are intended to constrain driver behaviour. The success rates are probably about the same.

Engineering out the opportunities for human fallibility (error) to become a causal factor in undesirable events is the legal imperative. Conducting Risk Assessments is the means by which the practicability of the possible controls can be assessed and subsequently justified.