Sorry, another thought around using the mancage is that it largely eliminates the risk of orthostatic shock or suspension trauma of someone left hanging in a harness, especially if they are non-responsive and can't deploy leg stirrups or otherwise mobilise their leg muscles. Something to watch out for especially when training for these recovery-type operations - I know of two occasions where the trainee patient succumbed with quite serious consequences very quickly... one resulted in a maritime safety alert a few years ago.

In Alpine Cliff Rescue extracting patients from crevasses in stretchers (with attendants) was only ever done (1990's) by hand (using ropes and pulleys) despite there often being a helicopter (even ones with winching capacity) being on site. That provided for more instantaneous and careful response as the lift progressed and if difficulties arose or adjustments had to be made - which was often the case. Helicopter winches, and suspended stretcher carries, were only ever done from open ground.

Your worker controlling the crane movements would want to be a very competent dogman.
Does your hook have a camera?
What wind limits do you apply for safe operating with a 'human' load?
How do you stop the load from rotating if you can't use a tagline?
Do you have reliable communications throughout the range of operations, and a back-up for if they fail?

A mancage on a crane hook is usually fine in the open, but the risks in a restricted space of using remote operators who are operating blind and relying on ground communications would be quite a lot higher. There is likely some international experience and guidance around this. The mancage does provide a working platform, but there are risks that are not well described within the guidance on those - e.g. having internalised handrails to prevent entrapment of fingers against exterior surfaces.

If there is determination to be suspended from the hook, you may also want to identify and incorporate a weak point in the extraction system so that if the worker/s did get hung-up, their body being squeezed by the harness is not the weakest link - something else is designed to fail first and without dire consequence. So, you might have a back-up safety line that is securely but manually taken in as they are extracted, while the main extraction line has a designed failure point in it (like a lanyard with shock absorber when XkN of force are applied).

Practising such a rescue in a simulated but safe environment and then analyzing it might give good insights. Personally, I suspect the allure of the powerful crane motor over the use of a hand-cranked winch might blind people to what can go wrong, and how much response and control the rescue leader actually has.

Sadly, this argument is reminiscent of the NRA's false dilemma regarding firearms: 'guns don't kill people, people kill people,' used to justify their continued circulation. Humans are thrilled by speed, but often overlook that our bodies haven't evolved to withstand forces greater than running speed without a high risk of injury or harm. Historically, injuries and fatalities from riding horses, flying bi-planes, and driving motor vehicles have persisted without serious questioning of real versus perceived risk. Enclosed vehicles, like Todd Conklin's crash-proof Volvo example, are relatively safer today. Therefore, I think that quad bikes should be considered a failed transport experiment and relegated to a display at MOTAT.

Expectations of WSNZ Inspectorate have to be tempered by their history and their opportunity to actually make a difference, given the arrangements they have to work within.

At the time of Pike River DoL had 70-odd "warranted" Inspectors (quite a few of whom were in supervisory or project roles, and so not frontline) undertaking "responsibility" for over 400, 000 workplaces throughout NZ. DoL management continually reported to Government on quota - that they were undertaking 1000's of inspections and many hundreds of "investigations" every year. The figures were often 'made-up' in time for reporting, and that practice was encouraged by management. The more superficial their workplace interactions, the more could be completed. Inspectors were castigated if they didn't achieve their quota - which annually management tried to increase. (For mining of course, it was an even worse ratio with only two inspectors for many hundreds of 'hazardous industry' but unregulated mines and quarries - Pike River were (reluctantly) kidded by the Mines Inspector into applying the UK gassy mines standards only months before the event.) The DoL management used to have lists of "findings" such as a worker's "momentary lapse of concentration" for writing-off investigations and injuries as investigated and solved. When the WSNZ was formed, Inspectors who had performed well under the previous regime were retained, while the new supervisors coming in often had little practical knowledge or experience as Inspectors, and continued down the same path of quota gathering.
Then there was also a decision to make a clear separation between Investigators and Inspectors, with the result that many of the Investigation pool staff who were generally more experienced staff suffered burn-out and left. Previously, Inspectors had carried out both functions, with oversight from peers and supervisors to ensure that new Inspectors gained direct learnings on what serious accidents investigation processes looked like (due to the lack of staff and the huge number of "serious harm" events - only about 1 in 10 events were actually investigated, and as noted above, often without any rigor or accident causation analysis that didn't blame the unfortunate victim.)
WorkSafe at an early stage stated that they would only recruit people who had formal qualifications as a pre-requisite - and suggested that would have been the NEBOSH certificate or diploma at least. I don't know if that happened or for how long. I do know that quite a few very suitable and highly regarded Police Detectives (looking for a change of role) were unsuccessful in being considered by WSNZ. Yet it was actually ex Police Detectives as trainee and new Inspectors who "rescued" the 2008 Tamahere Coolstore fire investigation for the DoL, so that meaningful evidence was obtained and an effective process was completed - very competent investigating Inspectors who shortly afterwards moved on.
Stu's story suggests that Inspector practices are still struggling with making a real and positive difference. WSNZ Inspectorate new processes were based on a small research project in the USA that suggested many "light" visits to workplaces kept H&S front of mind for employers, and helped to keep accident rates in check - a study that was criticised at the time, and was based on USA injury statistics! NZ are still well behind international best practice in proportion of Inspectors to the overall population, and the best performing countries for overall H&S such as the Netherlands, have quite a different approach. In NZ we can't even ratify and put into force global best practice from recent decades of ILO Conventions - so as usual poor governance leads to poor outcomes in practice https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102775.

Hi - I hold a different view on the matter of swimming pool isolation. I believe it is a necessary measure.

Applying risk assessment principles and control hierarchies to domestic life, as mandated in workplaces, can significantly extend and safeguard our lives, while also reducing the societal burden on ACC.

In a residence and its surroundings, there is a general expectation of safety from harm, mostly due to the Building Code (which can't be applied retrospectively, so has to be complied with up-front). This expectation should extend to the safety of visitors and guests. Numerous incidents of children drowning in unprotected pools (and unattended bathtubs) have occurred. Each incident is a catastrophe for the affected families and also particularly distressing for homeowners when a guest's child is involved.

Leaving a pool unfenced is a known and preventable hazard. Children and their parents often learn early on that the sea is dangerous, while swimming pools are perceived as safe, influencing their behavior around each. Not all kids have a pool at home, so many have limited understanding of how to swim, or otherwise safely negotiate a home pool environment.

As a parent engaged in tasks, such as organizing a six-year-old's birthday party, while also supervising children as they explore the home, it becomes impossible to ensure safety without a secure environment. The sea, in this instance being external to the home, distracts from the lower perception of risk and vigilance associated with home safety, and is a classic 'strawman' argument.

The resistance to "isolating the danger of a swimming pool" may likely stem more from concerns over aesthetics, such as disrupting an "infinity" view. However, this should have been addressed through safety-oriented design (and in the building consent process well before it was built). It can still be easily resolved with minor aesthetic disruption by including the use of glass partitions, a solution both effective and common in many upscale residences.

It may well be that the developer/current owners don't foresee children ever frequenting the place - but is that the likely reality? People trying to build things "not to code" have to be considerate of future users.

A business can't be all income with total disregard to how that money is made - that leads to all kinds of depraved, corrupt and unethical outcomes. Hence the international growth and demand for ESG, and concern around a "social license" to operate, and what that entails without a right to sue.

Just on a superficial understanding formed from media reporting I agree, based on the following:
- they make income from an activity,
- can restrict access to the site,
- licensed the operators as approved (I think?),
so do have an ability to influence safety around a known "real risk" hazard.

Trips to an uninhabited/deserted island in and of itself may be a drawcard, but "the hazard and perceived risks" provides additional attraction (especially as it was key marketing message), and so a premium to the amount the punters were charged and were willing to pay.

The punters had no ability to give "informed consent" to being exposed to a real hazard with real risks (regardless of that being illegal 'contracting-out' in NZ anyway), because of their reasonable expectation that in a "first-world" country famous for inventing the bungy, real risk would be managed.

Bungy jumping by comparison has only a "perceived risk" hazard because the "real risks" are so well addressed in the activity's controls. It was the lack of those effective controls in so much of NZ's Adventure Tourism industry that led to the recent need to specifically legislate the industry in the first place. Yet the concept and some guidance has been around since at least the 1980's - e.g. Mountain Safety Council books on a range of activities, and a Risk Management Manual, that were readily available. (In my opinion the way they included psychosocial risks, known as "loss of effect" - where someone had an adverse psychological outcome to their Adventure through physical harm, fright, or property damage, has been a major issue (in their absence) in subsequent risk management theory/practice or legislation, and are equally valid in the workplace issues of today).

In the same way that fairground rides "appear" to be dangerous and exciting, there is a reasonable public expectation that some regulatory body has robust oversight to ensure that risk is only an appearance. Also that those who have a say in whether that fairground or carnival is allowed to operate (e.g. Councils, Schools) will ensure it is safe and otherwise also be liable if actual harm results.

Q: Bouncy castle ride anyone?
A: What's the wind doing?