Perfect...
I also put a short excerpt from the risk register of the top few risks in the back of the SOP to give some context to why the procedures are there, and give some feeling to the overall level of risk in an activity.

yeah,but no audit, however good will replace proactive reporting.

I think you're missing what an audit is. It sits squarely in the assurance realm, not in the identification part of your safety management system.
Particularly if you're looking for "weak signals" it will not be effective; that is better left to those who know the processes best.

I had a similar experience recently. I found out the hard way that the reversing sensors take a couple of seconds to start working after backing into a friends car while in a hurry.

As others have said, you are under no obligation to provide smoking/vaping areas.
However, the risks here are more than simply safety. For me, seeing a group of smokers hanging around at a company's front doorstep, as the policy is obviously 'no smoking on site' really makes me think twice about going there.

The manufacturing companies are multinational, so international numbers are what count. That said, I've worn a woman's harness before, and the main problem area I found was the waist strap, which a lot of industrial harnesses don't seem to have.

The irony is that there are multiple options for recreational climbing harness for women so it's proof that there just isn't the desire for companies to do it.

New vehicle induction is a bit like a piece of string. How big is the change? Have you just introduced your first Heavy vehicle, or is it a different type of car?
These changes should be discussed in your change management process.
Also, new vehicle induction is more than about drivers. Is the vehicle more/less capable that current vehicles? Is it compatible with your procedures?

A licence is only evidence of continued competency immediately after it is issued. As others have said, most of us have been driving for decades without ever having our driving formally evaluated.

Not sure I agree. Given that GNS were a defendant in the case too, who would they have gone to as a SME for advice?
They didn't prevent any of the operators from installing safety gear, etc.

As a result we are now seeing customers overstepping the mark when it comes to safety requirements, because they don't fully understand the risks and think they are erring on the side of caution.

I'll take it one step further and openly state that in some contexts, injuries are a natural and accepted part of the work.
I highly doubt that the NZRU have any desire to pursue a zero injuries policy.
Likewise, any school should be accepting that minor injuries are a natural part of having healthy, active children in the playground.

Pushing for 'zero harm' has negative consequences where it discourages people from reporting - nobody wants to be the one who breaks the 'winning streak'. I have questioned a school where there were lower than expected incident reports.

It sounds to me like he doesn't separate the incident from the outcome.

The HOP principles have been lifted from aviation practice, so are well tried and tested and based on international best practice. As in another thread, the definition of an incident here may cloud the comparison. I suspect that Southpac are using a definition of "means any occurrence, other than an accident, that is associated with the operation of an aircraft and affects, or could affect, the safety of operation."

Human errors, mechanical failures, unpredictable weather, all mean that incidents aren't able to be entirely eliminated. So, the system must be designed to allow for these errors and prevent incidents from becoming accidents.

Take the Lockerbie disaster for example, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on 21 December 1988. No one would consider it an accident, it was most definitely a terrorist incident where 270 people died. — Andy Huntley

If you look at the CAANZ definition of an accident, it specifically excludes "when the injuries are self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to passengers and crew". Something like the Lockerbie bombing isn't classed as an aviation accident.
Our definition only starts from when a person boards an aircraft with the intention of flight to when the disembark. Other times, Worksafe's definition applies.

CAANZ's defintion of an incident is: "any occurrence, other than an accident, that is associated with the operation of an aircraft and affects or could affect the safety of operation"

I completely agree. If carrying out operations successfully and safely aren't in a company's objectives, then that indicates to me that safety is in its own silo.
Likewise, if profitability isn't acknowledged within safety goals.

But, again, you need to allow risks to cross disciplines within an organisation. So, the risk that a hazard poses will vary depending on who you are talking to, and the context.
One of the best ways to get senior management's buy-in on safety issues is: Here's the hazard, and here is the safety risk it poses, here's the financial risk it poses, and here's the compliance risk it poses. Now, each of those have (or should have) their own objectives, sometimes directly at odds with each other, but they all need to have the same definition of risk for an integrated risk management policy to work.
I'd be interested to know how many here specifically set out their company's safety objectives and targets?

I agree with that definition. Risk is bigger than safety. All too often when we talk of risk, we like to silo out safety, when in fact, risks all overlap.
A company that is struggling to manage its financial risks isn't in a good position to manage its safety risks. High staff turnover has financial, compliance, as well as safety risks.

How many companies specifically spell out what their objectives are when it comes to safety? When you know what your objectives are, then the definition above makes sense.

It's even more basic than that. Courier drivers, Taxi drivers, all have an acceptable risk level of a fatal accident. There are factors at play that employers simply can't control such as other drivers. Ever think about what the real risk is when getting on an aircraft? What are the manufacturer's acceptable level of risk for a complete airframe loss, because there is one.

The concept of an acceptable risk is spelt out quite clearly in ISO31000.

As for White Island, how many of those tourists would have gone out there if it wasn't an active volcano?

Here we have the difference between hazard management and risk management. Under a risk management system, we specifically accept some risk. In some situations (such as White Island, and other adventure activities) the risk is part of the attraction. The difference is that now, we will happily accept a perceived risk, but not tolerate any real risk, especially when it goes wrong.
The acceptable level of risk needs to be spelt out in the risk management policies. There are some industries that the risk of a fatality simply cannot be eliminated, so must be minimised as much as possible, and this needs to be documented. It's a concept that I find many in H&S find uncomfortable, but is better than denying that there is still any risk of fatality.

At the risk of adding yet another male voice here, I'll relate what my wife's thoughts were, as we have had pretty much this discussion.
She was asked to join the Board of an Association that represents a very male-dominated industry, but was very hesitant. Her reasons? She didn't think she had the required governance expertise and didn't want to get the position as the 'token female' on the team.

I couldn't really speak to the tokenism thoughts, but convinced her that two of the others on the Board definitely wouldn't take her on as a token gesture, but would definitely take her on in a mentoring way. Once she got involved, she quickly discovered that she knew as much or more about governance as most of the existing Board members.
My take-away from this was that men will apply for the job they want and work out how to do it. Women tend to gather the skills and then apply for the job. End result is that the man will look more ambitious.

I'm not commenting on the rights or wrongs with this, just making an observation.

This is where exposure amount comes into things as well. No real point doing 6 monthly reviews for something like winter seasonal work.
We have high risk work such as frost flying work for helicopters, and we review the risks at the beginning of the frost season. It both serves as a risk review, and recurrency training for pilots and the crew working with them.

We already do permit 'selected drug use'. Caffeine, Nicotine, prescription drugs (within limits). It's just a case of where do you draw the line. Currently, when it comes to alcohol, different companies draw the line on different sides.
Companies I have worked for have generally allowed it, however, they kept a close eye on it, however, the culture within the company was not one of accepting excessive consumption. They didn't hesitate to send someone home if they turned up for work hungover.

And I guess the core of it is; what is the company culture? Do you have employees who will hang around until midnight and drink everything they can? Or are they the type of people who will have 1 or two, eat a bit and then go home?

With regards to why it is necessary - it isn't necessary at all, but that's no reason to ban it. I think sometimes that workplaces are becoming about only doing what is necessary, and anything that doesn't directly relate to work that may invite a small amount of risk gets cancelled.