If you are looking for an expert in Physical Ergonomics you might want to reach out to Sue Alexander - at Alexander Ergonomics - https://www.alexergonomics.co.nz/

Many thanks Guys.

Hi Craig, Thanks for the mention. I think you hit the nail on the head to some extent but I would hope that common sense would prevail. There is research to suggest that when individuals are in a heightened state of risk, their behaviour is more cautious. Although that is subject to debate and very much focused on context.

I can imagine that a car driver seeing this for the first time would be initially startled which could distract them from other things, maybe a kid attempting to cross from the other side? But then over time would get used to it and thus the effectiveness of the signage is likely to diminish.

I would be interested in a prolonged study to measure the effectiveness of this sign on car driving and maneuvering.

There is also the (somewhat cynical) consideration whether this car park is special in that kids are prone to run across the road, and others are not, because they do not have a sign such as this?

And a final comment is maybe the problem resides with the kids and dare I say the parents and maybe there should be signage for the pedestrians too in a similar sort of fashion as they have with some level crossings.

Just a few thoughts of mine at the end of a somewhat taxing day.

Thanks again and Merry Xmas all. :D

Sorry to be a party pooper but it concerns me that fatigue risk management can be reduced to a simple flowchart when there are so many mitigating circumstances that can exacerbate the onset of fatigue. I have seen flow charts in the past, which on paper, look good but if you have an under resourced team fatigue is going to be inevitable. Then there are the issues of circumstances frequently missed in the charts such as diet, personal circumstances, commute, work environment (noise, heat and vibration to mention a few), and even nature of work can have a significant impact. As a result, the onus is placed on the employee to put their hand up and advise their management they are fatigued which will result in being stood down for the rest of the (under-resourced) team having to pick up the additional duties. As a result, many workers can feel compelled to 'truck on'. Fatigue flow charts and indeed many other flow charts have the ability to move attention away from more systemic issues with the workplace. Sorry again for the rant but it is something I have had quite a bit of experience working on and feel quite strongly about it. The reference made by Michaela is a good one but please consider the wider issues as well. Happy to discuss with further with you, Rebecca.

Hi Alana,
I have done the two day course and actually found it lacking in areas associated with human factors, and systems thinking. It also appeared to embrace more linear approaches to human error, which is quickly being superseded by systems thinking, safety II, safety differently, resilience engineering. I have also had the opportunity to provide human factors reviews on ICAM investigations and they have shown a very limited and somewhat superficial understanding of human factors, and I discovered many additional findings previously missed. Now admittedly, my ICAM training was given a good 7 or 8 years ago and things may have changed somewhat to the curriculum. However, given that more and more organisations (such as ACC and Worksafe) are starting to appreciate that the depth of human factors in a dynamic work environment plays a fundamental role in things going good or bad, I would at the very least recommend you do not treat ICAM as a fait accompli to your incident investigations. Seek relevant human factors expertise through the HFESNZ or HASANZ directories - and the same advice (concerning HASANZ) if you need any other specialist to look into your investigations.

Feel free to contact me should you need any further information.

Karl
021 858 283

Me too - karldotbridgesathfexdotcodotnz

Having done a multitude of FRAM modelling workshops produces way too many differences between WAI and WAD. However, I have had a variety of reactions after FRAM modelling a task such as "I never knew my job was so complex", or (in jest) "I need to ask the boss for a pay rise".

Hey Mike,
We did some work for CHASNZ looking at Safety II thinking around people and plant. Also trialling a vehicle/people proximity warning system for a customer. This also rings of human factors particularly workplace layout, decision making and aspects of safety by design. Feel free to get in touch, or have a look at the HASANZ register. I am contactable on LinkedIn, or ask Helen for my number.

Cheers, Karl

As a human factors engineer I have a few comments:
First of all great idea - certainly has the opportunity to add another layer of safety into this safety critical task.

Advertisement - the video showed the spotter waving his arms and shouting to stop the accidents happening to no avail. How is a coloured glove going to make any difference.

Proliferation - often new technology is challenged by the concern associated with proliferation. Take self driving cars for example - concerns of how they will interact with cars driven by humans are ongoing. How will gloves like this affect the expectations of the drivers and their behaviour when interacting with spotters who do not own such a pair of gloves.

Wear and tear - some colours fade and completely change colour over time. Also how effective would the gloves be if they were dirty, or torn.

Environment - the good thing about traffic lights is that they illuminate but even they can be hard to spot in bright light or sun strike conditions - that is partly why the red or green lights have specific locations on a traffic signal. With gloves that have no illumination and clearly the same location for their red and green signals may have vastly reduced effectiveness in bright (or indeed dark) conditions.

I would love the opportunity to give these gloves a go and do some testing on them but for now (when I should be working) these are a few of my initial thoughts.

I did a piece of work some years ago on near miss frameworks which gave me the opportunity to ascertain many different contractor approaches, which were wildly different. I also - as part of my PhD - set up a confidential near miss reporting system online that people could access via their phone. Very cheap to set up and manage. I think the key is not to set targets (how many near miss reports), and critical to feed back to the workforce the outcomes of their reports. Communication and culture are the key issues. Happy to discuss further with you. Look me up on LinkedIn or message me directly.

Agreed - it is an example where real safety and corporate image diverge. It does not always have to be like this but often this is what happens. If only the deeper understanding of these sort of messages that many HSE professionals have could be communicated out to the populace so that we no longer see these signs.

I saw a corker only yesterday whilst waiting for a meeting in Mission bay. A man riding one of these scooters with his very young child who could barely walk clinging onto his leg as he scooted around a busy playground. There is a reason why we have human factors but I am not too sure if the e-scooter companies are aware of it. We are getting a daily demonstration of optimism bias in action.

Hi All, first post to the forum so hopefully I don't start off on the wrong foot. I have been working in human factors for almost 15 years now, investigated/co-investigated 100s of incidents, utilised a range of methodologies for investigative and risk management purposes, and even the proud owner of humanerror.co.nz.

However, I do not subscribe to the term human error and especially the way it is used by many organisations as a fait accompli. I recall a recent "simple case of human error" that was quoted in the news (I get daily google feeds of news items with the term human error in them), whereby a nurse administered methadone to a baby - I found this case particularly upsetting as a father to two children - and utterly unfair on the nurse who must have been beside themselves with the awfulness of their actions. My experience of working with nurses suggest there could have been many reasons for this mistake happening and not necessarily associated with ineptitude driven by the discourse of the article I read.

I do have a lot of time for the Safety II / resilience engineering understanding of challenges to individual resiliency as it favours the idea that humans are not an erroneous liability but actually a commodity, managing the day to day challenges of the workplace. No two days are the same, each day has its challenges to our resilience to manage our day, and it is only when our ability to be resilient goes beyond its limits, do errors happen. I am sure many of you reading this may feel I am preaching to the converted - I hope so. I believe Safety II and its associated tools embraces the human factor much better than any older concepts associated with human error / swiss cheese / HFACS systems that seem to provide more aesthetic value than a true understanding of the human element in the workplace.

Happy to discuss further over coffee. Have been working closely with Erik Hollnagel (father of Safety II) for a few years now and have learnt a lot with using his FRAM methodology to increase workplace resilience and eradicate old concepts of human error. I have learnt a lot from Erik and would love the opportunity to share that learning.

Have a great day.

Karl