Comments

  • PEACE and LOVE
    But Andrew, you didn't ask for my consent to use my family name!
    It was bad enough in the 1960s with Hippies coining Peace and Love but then along came those Greenpeace people who roguishly squatted on my name.
    It is, perhaps, fortunate that my friend Bruce Lovejoy and I did not set up a consultancy Lovejoy and Peace or we would have had a disagreement with the Salvation Army who, some years ago, used our good name to promote goodwill during the Christmas season. Bah!!! Humbug!
    I shall consult my lawyers, Sue, Grabbit and Run to find out what restitution I can seek!!!
  • Permit to Work standard
    I cannot speak to the current status of the Taranaki common permit. I knew about it 2000-2003 when I was the corporate Risk Manager for what was then Natural Gas Corporation. Your knowledge is therefore more up to date than mine.
    Maybe someone else in the forum with current knowledge can comment?
  • Permit to Work standard
    I have searched my database and found the following. Some are ancient and some are reports of events. Two in bold are joint Australia/NZ standards and may be relevant and available.
    There used to be a common permit system in Taranaki for the oil & gas industry.
    Hope that's some help
    DoL. (1985). Dust Explosions in Factories: precautions required with combustible dusts. Wellington: Department of Labour.
    DoL. (1988). Hot Work on Drums and Tanks. Wellington: Department of Labour.
    Wakakura, M., & Tamura, M. (1991). Explosion and fire caused due to insufficient purging during inspection work on a continuous extractor. Retrieved 22 December 2014, from http://www.sozogaku.com/fkd/en/cfen/CC1000088.html
    HSE. (1995). Hot work in docks. Information Sheet Sudbury: HSE.
    SA AS 1674.1:1997. Safety in welding and allied processes Part 1: Fire precautions. Sydney: Standards Australia.
    HSE. (2000). Hot work on small tanks and drums. Information Sheet Sudbury: HSE. Retrieved from www.hsebooks.co.uk
    CSB. (2001). Refinery Incident – Motiva Enterprises LLC. Incident Investigation report 2001-05-I-DE Washington, DC: Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. Retrieved from http://www.csb.gov/
    SA/SNZ2865:2001. Safe working in a confined space. Wellington: Standards New Zealand.
    GAPS. (2003). Cutting, welding and other hot work. Guidance Note Avon, CT: Global Asset Protection Services.
    Manz, A. (2003). Welding, cutting and other hot work. In Cote, A., Hall, J., Powell, P. & Grant, C. (Eds.), Fire Protection Handbook (19th ed., pp. 6-211 - 216-220). Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, Inc.
    HSE. (2005). Guidance on permit-to-work systems: A guide for the petroleum, chemical and allied industries. Guidance Note: General Series Sudbury: HSE Books. Retrieved from http://books.hse.gov.uk/
    DoL. (2006). Health and Safety in Welding. Wellington: Department of Labour.
    FM Global. (2006). Hot work management. Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet Johnston, RI: Author. Retrieved from http://www.fmglobal.com
    GAPS. (2009). Loss prevention and control for cutting, welding, hot work operations. Guidance Note Avon, CT: Global Asset Protection Services.
    HSE. (2009). Safe work in confined spaces. Guidance Note Sudbury: HSE Books. Retrieved from http://books.hse.gov.uk/
    Hayes, J. (2010). Safety Decision Making – Drawing a Line in the Sand. Working Paper 74 Canberra: Australian National University. Retrieved from www.http://ohs.anu.edu.au/
    Marmo, L., Piccinini, N., Russo, G., et al. (2013). Multiple Tank Explosions in an Edible-Oil Refinery Plant: A Case Study. Chemical Engineering & Technology, 36(7), 1131-1137.
    Burlet-Vienney, D., Chinniah, Y., Bahloul, A., & Roberge, B. (2015). Occupational safety during interventions in confined spaces. Safety Science, 79, 19-28.
    Jahangiri, M., Hoboubi, N., Rostamabadi, A., et al. (2016). Human Error Analysis in a Permit to Work System: A Case Study in a Chemical Plant. Safety and Health at Work, 7(1), 6-11.
  • How do you identify who is who on your site?
    I echo Andrew's comments but ask the question "Why is Hi Vis clothing required?". I regard PPE as an admission of failure unless it can be demonstrated to be the only solution. That can result in some creative arguments leading to, for example, segregation of vehicles and people on larger sites, either spatially or by time.
    In relation to Hi Vis generally, there is research showing it is of limited value under some circumstances and, in some cases, can act to cause confusion. For example, a worker may be unable to get the right depth of field when looking at a busy worksite at night due to so many reflective strips and colours moving.
    Maybe move the discussion from Hi Vis as PPE to uniforms for workers with company names and/or badges printed onto jackets, Tee or long-sleeve shirts that are also Hi Vis? Pride in who workers work for?
    Perhaps an article for Safeguard magazine that is research-based and informed by some good case studies?
  • Where have we come from and where are we going?
    Thank you and on 3 September I will be presenting this article at the Wellington NZISM Branch.
  • Risk Assessment Matrix
    Well said Mark!
    Using a matrix without some reliable calibration is ridiculous. As an analogy, my Toyota Yaris has a top speed of 1,795. What?!!! KPH, MPH? None of the above. It's relative to the number of snails I can pass in 270 seconds. But that's a stupid way of measuring speed.
    Without some generally accepted calibration for a matrix (not THE matrix) we cannot compare "risks". And as soon as two of us write down what we mean by the scales and design of matrices we have differences. "But mine is correct" - for the whole organisation, for all organisations?
    So, stop worrying about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin and ask what is risk. Using the ISO definition ("effect of uncertainty on objectives") gets us into fruitful discussions about the objectives of the organisation, activity, plant, etc (and see how many people can answer those questions). Then ask where are there uncertainties about achieving the objectives. Can we do that "on time, in full 95% of the time" (OTIF95). No? What effect does that have?
    And where will that get OHS practitioners? Away from arcane discussions about the matrix and into organisational improvement.
    Which loops back to Mark's comments about worker engagement.
  • Risk Assessment Matrix
    I think this all misses a key point: the risk matrix is a reporting tool, not an analysis tool. To use it you must have estimated the consequence of interest and then estimated the probability of that consequence. This is made clear in the soon-to-be published edition of ISO31010 "Risk Assessment Techniques". (Please note, we are interested in the probability of the consequence, not of the event: think Canterbury earthquakes.)
    The word estimate is deliberate: it is impossible to give a consequence or probability with any certainty. There will be a range of consequences and a range of probabilities. Each range will depend on the effectiveness of the controls and that effectiveness will itself be a range (perhaps lick a finger and stick it in the air?).
    Trying to use words to specify the likelihood leads to each user interpreting the words differently. This was clearly pointed out by Sherman Kent: you can read his article at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/6words.html . Research has since confirmed this many times. But if you're happy with a licked finger and wild inaccuracy, no need to read this article.
    The matrix is about as accurate as using a faulty speedometer to get some idea how fast you are driving. Then try explaining speeding to a traffic police officer - or the inaccurate risk assessment to a WorkSafe inspector.
  • Audits vs Review
    Pretty much as Jared has written but we are dealing with a standard so we should check the definitions in the standard and, if there are none, the ISO definitions. But first, the status of 4801.
    AS/NZS4801 is due to be superceded by AS/NZS ISO45001. I've asked Standards NZ when that will happen.
    Audit is defined in 4801 but not review.
    For recent definitions we should look at ISO19011 "Guidelines for auditing management systems" to be used when auditing a management system standard such as 45001. ISO19011 defines an audit as a “systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining audit evidence and evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to which the audit criteria are fulfilled”. Audit evidence is then defined.
    Review is an “activity undertaken to determine the suitability, adequacy and effectiveness of the subject matter to achieve established objectives”.
    And beware: ISO19011 has been revised and is now the 2018 edition but Standards Australia and NZ have not yet adopted it so we are still on the 2014 AS/NZS. More on that later.
  • Organic solvents - alert and classic story
    Thank you, it's so easy to forget the lessons of history.
    I just ran a search in my database and found about 15 HSE research reports that mention neurotoxins, and a recent IOSH magazine article about ototoxins that damage the otoliths in the ear, exacerbating noise-induced hearing loss.
    So, Peter, here's a challenge: how many Safeguard readers are studying for academic qualifications and could be persuaded to write well-researched, 2000-word articles that cite free-to-access reliable literature? Safeguard could offer an annual cash prize for the best article (by readers' vote).
    Maybe WorkSafe could be persuaded to support the initiative?
    Why academic? Because they have access to tertiary libraries. But maybe make it open to anyone.
    The authors would score CPD points and have something good to add to their CVs, something that might contribute to their study, and we the readers would gain knowledge.
    There is so much information "out there" that we don't find or remember.
    Just a thought.
  • Human factors specialist wanted
    Many thanks, will do
  • A strange request
    Did you mention section 45(b) to them?
    And the Fair Trading Act?
    I am reminded of my comments in another posting about developing a single "management system" based on Annex SL, ISO9001, etc and (of course) ISO45001. All applied using the KISS principle.

    Hello to all readers who provide OHS consultancy services to SMEs. Help them develop effective ways to run the business that include embedded OHS systems.
    Compliance will follow.
  • Lime scooters
    I had another look at the Act.
    Section 37(1) seems to me to cover a local authority who manages or controls a workplace such as a footpath. I think that section 37(4) limits that duty in such a way as to leave wide open the duty of a local authority.
    Section 42 imposes a duty on (in this case) Lime in relation to "plant that could be used at a workplace" and extends the duty to 42(2)(f) "persons who are at or in the vicinity". If a juicer who is at work or a Lime user is at work and harms such other people there would seem to me to be a breach.
    Maybe there is a proper lawyer out there who can comment?
  • E-scooters: am I right to be worried?
    Reportedly these scooters can go 2 or 3 times faster than running pedestrians. They are a smaller target for bus drivers to see - er, avoid - so there might be more mangled scooterists than pedestrians.
  • E-scooters: am I right to be worried?
    Next week Wellington City Council is considering whether to allow another E-Scooter business to operate in the CBD but with certain restrictions. I have wondered if they considered their position under section 37 HSWA because they control most roads and footpaths and these are workplaces.
    Where was the risk assessment that is an implied requirement of the reasonably practicable test?
  • Price of AS/NZS Standards
    I agree the cost of standards is sometimes pretty steep and (as the NZISM representative on two joint standards committees) often wonder where the money goes. Committee members are all volunteers and we pay our own expenses (unless someone else is willing to pay them). When a standard is published we get one free hard copy and electronic copy for our personal use.
    Over the last year there has been a battle about who pays for adoption of ISO and IEC standards when they are proposed to be joint standards. MBIE started off wanting someone to sponsor such adoption. Things were getting farcical at one stage but there is now a chance that MBIE will pay.
    In Australia, the private sector company that sells standards (SAIG) might be distressed if joint standards were made free of charge but they also earn money by selling other documents and providing consultancy services. Standards Australia is funded by the federal government.
    International standards are copyright ISO and/or IEC. The IEC dependability standards are important but few people buy them, perhaps because of cost?
    When running training courses I always reference the relevant standards and, in 2019, will be cross referencing to the common structure of management systems standards set out in Annex SL. These include ISO45001, ISO9001 and ISO14001. Annex SL is free but you need to know where to find it.
    I should stop here: this is making me depressed!
  • Is 'human error' ever acceptable as a cause?
    Hi Richard: I'm pleased to see that HS(G) 48 is still free of charge at http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/hsg48.htm . Sadly IEC62508 "Human Reliability" (which is also very useful) is over $400. I've recommended both to people on the ISO45001 Masterclasses when talking about clause 6.1.2 (risk assessments) and the definition of hazard in the HSWA2015. The Act strongly implies we must include human factors when considering if risk has been minimised SFAIRP.
  • Measuring the High Vis of Clothing
    The subject of high-vis PPE came up a few years ago in the old forum and prompted me to research some of the background material, but not this specific question.
    There is an ISO standard (which I don't have) that says in the scope:
    "ISO 20471:2013 specifies requirements for high visibility clothing which is capable of visually signalling the user's presence. The high visibility clothing is intended to provide conspicuity of the wearer in any light condition when viewed by operators of vehicles or other mechanized equipment during daylight conditions and under illumination of headlights in the dark.
    Performance requirements are included for colour and retroreflection as well as for the minimum areas and for the placement of the materials in protective clothing".
    Based on that I would agree that any high-vis gear that has become scruffy should be replaced.
  • Resetting the standard
    Hi Auriette
    I've only just picked up your message.
    Yes, I'm in Invercargill on Wednesday and there are spaces available on the course. If you phone me on 0274713723 before 1500 on Sunday 26th I can bring extra course handbooks and sort out billing you.
    Chris
  • Is 'human error' ever acceptable as a cause?
    The trouble is, most people have failed to grasp the implications of "reasonably practicable" and they therefore stop any investigation with the convenient post-event attribution "human error".
    Perhaps we should start with the premise that an unintended action of one component (a human being) of a system is known to be error-prone and such errors can cause severe consequences. We could then ask if any risk treatments are practicable (ie, "capable of being done") that would minimise risk ("effect of uncertainty on objectives" in ISO31000). Those treatments might start with redesign of the overall system or components of the system. The cost of any treatments that are found to be practicable can then be calculated (along with any additional benefits they may offer) to ascertain if they would be reasonable.
    From a quality management point of view, repeated failures to achieve the requirements for product safety, quality, etc would result in quality improvement. Why not for OHS?
    There is research evidence that organisations with an ISO9001 quality management system find it easier to introduce an OHS management system. I have been arguing in the current NZISM ISO45001 Masterclasses that the structure of management system standards provides OHS practitioners/professionals with an opportunity to introduce integrated HS/Q or HSEQ management systems with economic benefits for their PCBUs.
    And to reduce "human error" and injuries.
  • Resetting the standard
    I've not yet seen the article but, having represented NZISM on p45001, can respond to some of Dianne's comments.
    AS/NZS4801 has not been reviewed or revised since 2001. It should have been in the roughly five yearly cycle of review/revision but escaped the attention of Standards Australia and Standards NZ. When ISO45001 has been adopted it is likely that Standards Australia and Standards NZ will ask what should happen to AS/NZS4801. Based on experience with other joint adoptions they will be asked to withdraw AS/NZS4801. BSI, ILO and other "owners" of OHSMS standards have indicated the same will happen to their standards, leaving us with an internationally written and jointly adopted standard with a review/revision cycle.
    AS/NZS4801 (also an industry based standard) obviously was not developed by ISO using Annex SL as the framework and is not a management system standard (MSS) as defined by ISO. The gaps are especially evident in ISO45001 clause 4 - there is no equivalent in AS/NZS4801.
    Even a cursory reading of ISO45001 and (say) ISO9001 shows their relationship and the opportunities for OHS practitioners/professionals to integrate an ISO45001 OHSMS seamlessly with other ISO MSS to the benefit of their organisation (less paperwork, etc).
    ISO45001 was developed in a multi-party process that included unions, employers, OHS organisations (including IOSH) and others.
    Nobody is required to implement it but, based on the Masterclasses I am running for NZISM, several hundred NZISM members have it in their medium to long term plans. The Masterclasses include how to include a gap analysis to help attendees see the big picture and not work inside an OHS silo.